Concealment Motivation: The 1904 Loan
Concealment Motivation: The 1904 Loan
Motivation - The Survival of The Imperial Russian GovernmentRussia's need for gold in 1909 can be traced to events that had occurred five years earlier. The 5% State Exchequer Bonds of 1904 (May 14, 1904)
Russian battleship Retvizan on the rocks at Port Arthur Harbor entrance. On the morning of February 8, 1904, under the command of Vice-Admiral Togo Heihachiro, the main body of the Japanese Combined Squadrons appeared off Port Arthur (now Lushun, in North-East China), Russia's ice-free naval base in Manchuria, and home to its Pacific Fleet. Shortly after midnight the Japanese launched a surprise attack against Russia's Port Arthur naval base. At 0028 hours, February 9, 1904, the Japanese fired torpedoes at the moored and anchored Russian ships. Before the Russian gunners could open retaliatory fire, the best battleships of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Tsessarevitch and Retvizan, and also the first-rated cruiser Pallada, were hit.1 Thus began the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
1905 color print of the Japanese bombardment of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, with the Japanese chop, artist signature and caption inside bomb depiction (right). The conflict between Russia and Japan had its roots over the prior decade in the simultaneous ambitions of both Japan and Russia to develop 'spheres of influence' in Manchuria and Korea, mainly at the expense of China. After the surprise attack at Port Arthur, a series of quick Japanese victories, which astounded the world, soon followed. The Japanese were successful in their capture of Port Arthur (Jan., 1905), victorious under General Oyama at Shenyang (Feb.-Mar., 1905), and Admiral Togo's fleet defeated the Russian Baltic Fleet under Zinovi Rozhdestvenski, which had sailed a distance of over 18,000 miles to act as reinforcements, at Tsushima (May, 1905). The Russo-Japanese War ended, through the mediation of President Theodore Roosevelt, on September 5, 1905 with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth (New Hampshire). The Russo-Japanese War brought recognition to Japan as a major world power. Russia's defeat in the war increased the Russian public's dissatisfaction with the Tsarist government and precipitated substantial social upheavals in 1905 - and ultimately led, as a consequence of the massive costs of the war, to the collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917.2 The early Japanese successes [in the Russo-Japanese War] made it easier for Japan, and harder for Russia, to obtain the foreign loans necessary for the continuation of hostilities - this was very much a "fight now, pay later" kind of war. J. N. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima The Russo-Japanese war was, to that time, the largest, most technologically advanced and complex war the world had ever witnessed. Such a war required significant finance, and, in 1904, the Imperial Russian Government turned primarily to its French bankers for funding, at first seeking support for a public bond offering. RUSSIA NEGOTIATES PARIS, April 25. - I hear that negotiations for a new loan between Russia and a Paris financial syndicate are as good as concluded. The amount of the loan is to be 800,000,00f., ($160,000,000.) New York Times, April 26, 1904, 2:2; But, then: FRANCE BARS RUSSIAN LOAN. PARIS, April 28. - I learn that negotiations have been in progress during the past few days for floating a new Russian loan on the French market, but they have in a measure failed owing to the absolute refusal of M. Rouvier, the Minister of Finance, to countenance another appeal being made to the French public. New York Times, April 29, 1904, 2:2. And the French banks and financiers do, indeed, take up the now non-public 1904 loan.
RUSSIAN LOAN SUBSCRIBED PARIS, May 5. - A representative of one of the banks forming the syndicate underwriting the Russian loan said: New York Times, May 6, 1904, 2:7. [In 1904] I began with a foreign loan. Paris had faith in our victory over Japan, and my approach to the French market was met very sympathetically. In some two weeks, without any special effort on my part, I had succeeded in effecting a 5 per cent short-term loan of 300,000,000 rubles, or 800,000,000 francs, to be redeemed in five years, that is, in 1909. The group of banks with which the loan was negotiated gave semi-official assurance that when the redemption of the loan was due another loan would be granted to consolidate this loan. [Emphasis supplied.] The success of the negotiation surpassed all of our expectations, and I was congratulated for my accomplishment. I must admit, however, that my part was the least deserving, for my success was due to the general belief of the French in our speedy victory over our enemy. This made subsequent disillusionment more painful and the part I later had to play more difficult. Out of My Past; The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, Russian Minister of Finance, 1904-1914, And, finally, the terms of the 1904 loan: PARIS, May 11. - Following the return of M. Hoettinger from St. Petersburg a semi-official statement was made to-day of the final conditions of the Russian loan. The total issue will be $160,000,000 in 5 per cent Treasury bonds of $100 each, redeemable May, 1909, with interest payable in May and November annually, and the first interest to be paid next November. The bonds have the exceptional advantage of being exempt from present or future taxes. Holders are also given advantages when the period of conversion or consolidation arrives during the six months preceding May 1, 1909. [Emphasis supplied.] The only question not determined is whether the entire amount will be issued now or $120,000,000 now and the balance later. It is said that foreign offers have been received, including some American. But practically the entire issue will be underwritten here. Journal of Commerce, May 12, 1904, 1:2. RUSSIA'S LOAN $160,000,000 ST. PETERSBURG, May 12. - The following statement has been officially communicated to the press: New York Times, May 13, 1904, 2:2. The non-public 1904 loan was placed with leading financiers who would take the high-interest, short term bonds. The issuance of the 5% State Exchequer Bonds of 1904 was, in essence, an expedience - necessary for the Russian Government and, no doubt, profitable for the subscribing banks/financiers. |
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FOOTNOTES1All three vessels resumed service after this attack, but were laid-up for weeks. 2See I. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (1985); J. N. Westwood, Russia against Japan (1986). |
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